The EU is tangential to what I really want to know; SADC regional security policy. But I believe Ovid was on to something when he said: "You can learn from anyone even your enemy." Ovid's quote is quite apt if we admit David Mitrany's hypothesis that regional integration is national rivalries writ large. By which he meant, wars will no longer be fought between nation states but between continental unions, due to regional integration schemes.
by Kudakwashe Kanhutu
 |
| Greater than the sum of its parts? |
To what extent have member states
been required to sacrifice autonomy in national foreign policy through the
creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy?
Introduction
The question to what extent have states given up their autonomy as a result of the codification of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), lends itself well to one of the key integration debates. This debate can be characterised as this question: is the EU inexorably taking steps towards a federal union or do the national governments always retain control over the pace of integration? Theoretical approaches falling in either the supranationalism or the intergovernmentalism camp markedly evince this debate. As an example, Federalism and its precepts falls in the supranationalism side of the debate, and a theory such as Neorealism – which is state-centric – would support the primacy of national governments: intergovernmentalism.
CFSP is the attempt by the European Union (EU) to speak with a single voice in its foreign relations with third countries. My paper seeks to answer the question whether the EU has evolved to the extent where ‘high politics’ now admit themselves to meaningful pooling of sovereignty. The history of European integration has no shortage of examples of states refusing to allow any encroachment on their sovereignty in issues pertaining to foreign and security policy. I will, to an extent, be relying on the competing theoretical approaches to integration to try and highlight where change has occurred and where it has not. The fact that the intergovernmental approach was largely retained for CFSP, and the introduction of the veto power under the Amsterdam Treaty suggests that states are determined to maintain their autonomy.
[1] But, other factors such as Europeanisation, institutionalisation and, the demands of the current international strategic environment, augurs well for the argument that autonomy has been severely curtailed under CFSP. Before we go on to speak of the merits of either argument, it is also useful to hear the voices who propose that only states can have a foreign policy.
Can the European Union Have a
Foreign Policy?
Three different arguments from different groups of scholars are presented on this score by Brian White. He notes the first argument that; EU foreign policy already exists as an integral part of European integration, and this can be seen in its codification in the TEU.
[2] This first argument is suggestive of neofunctionalism’s spillovers postulate, which predicts that integration in ‘low politics’ will create pressures to integrate in ‘high politics.’
[3] The second argument he presents is that European foreign policy does not yet exist, but there is a need for it owing to the failures of the EU to deal with crises, especially in the Balkans.
[4] This argument is cognisant of the external pressures exerted on Europe to act in concert so as to effectively tackle problems that cannot be solved unilaterally. The third argument is from a group whose view it is that a ‘European foreign policy does not exist, it never will and, moreover, it never should!’
[5] The third argument is, perhaps, an extreme way of saying only nation states can be thought of as having a foreign policy. This third view finds support in David Allen’s position that “the determination to preserve national foreign policies is ultimately at odds with the ambition to create a European foreign policy.”
[6]
What these three points of view exhibit is that different theoretical approaches on the same subject can come to diametrically opposed conclusions. However, in this case, the third viewpoint that EU foreign policy cannot exist, is confounded by the reality. The first two arguments have a basis in current reality. The current reality is that there is a variety of actors in the international system which can be thought of as having a foreign policy. The EU as it exists is one such actor. Hazel Smith’s definition of EU foreign policy captures this possibility for the EU. She has defined it as; “the capacity to make and implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the European Union.”
[7] From this definition, the logical question to ask is if the EU possesses ‘actorness’ and therefore common values, interests, and policies to promote abroad? Once we have established this we will then be able to look at what impact, if any, the advent of CFSP has had on member states’ autonomy in foreign policy.
The four attributes that award a body ‘actorness’ (or agency) in international relations are listed as recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion.
[8] The first attribute seems unproblematic for the EU. Recognition refers to the extent to which an entity is accepted and interacts with others.
[9] European External Action Services (EEAS) missions around the globe can be seen a sign of this recognition. The second attribute – authority – can be thought of as the legal competence to act,
[10] and here, the question becomes does the EU have a legal personality? This question has been answered by Bretherton and Vogler, who see ‘no necessary correspondence between achievement of legal personality and actorness in behavioural terms.’
[11] They thus argue that it is not necessary to have a legal personality to be a competent authority in world affairs, weak states have legal personality but do not exert as much influence as the EU.
[12] The EU therefore has this competence insofar as other actors request its services, as in the invitation by the parties to the Aceh/Indonesia Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which resulted in the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) of 2005 - 2006.
Autonomy and cohesion are attributes that have a direct bearing for the question at hand of whether member states have sacrificed their autonomy as a result of the advent of CFSP. Autonomy refers to ‘institutional distinctiveness and independence from other actors’
[13] whereby “an international organization, to be an actor, should have a distinctive institutional apparatus, even if it is grounded in, or intermingles with, domestic political institutions.”
[14] Again the EEAS would be an apt example of the institutional apparatus charged with giving the EU a coherent external projection, despite the intergovernmental nature of foreign policy articulation. The fourth attribute, cohesion, is the extent ‘to which an entity can formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences.’
[15] This fourth attribute is said to have four dimensions, namely; value, tactical, procedural and output cohesion.
[16] Value cohesion refers to compatibility of goals; while the ability to make incompatible goals fit each other is tactical cohesion; procedural cohesion is consensus on rules and procedures; and lastly, output cohesion is the member states’ ability to successfully formulate policies.
[17] This last attribute and its dimensions is cogent for the EU as it can explain how CFSP can be possible regardless of differences. To my mind then, the EU possesses all four attributes of ‘actorness.’ Still, the question remains to be answered why member states have not yet allowed the foreign policy domain to become supranational to the same extent as, for example, the European Central Bank (ECB). Further still, why did the Amsterdam Treaty actually allow member states the power to veto a vote where a special national interest is threatened?
[18]
Actor Sui Generis?
The existence of these residual sensitivities for national governments with regards foreign and security policy would give credence to the neorealist argument that national governments retain autonomy even under CFSP. But, the edges can be taken off the neorealist argument somewhat if we follow the direction of Michael Smith with regards how to properly conceive European foreign policy. He argues that to think of the EU as either a supranational entity or an intergovernmental one is to misunderstand the nature of the beast completely.
[19] The argument here is that the EU should be treated as ‘sui generis – a new kind of international actor.’
[20] This logic leads us to accept Keukelerie and MacNaughtan’s position that ‘EU foreign policy is a complex multilevel policy network… . where EU member state interaction is not a simple two level-game, with the national and EU levels remaining neatly separated. Rather EU and national foreign policies are interconnected and mutually influencing.’
[21] According to this frame of reference then, the EU’s foreign policy defies both supranationalist or neorealist instrument-of-state-power conceptions. Thus, the EU, conceived as actor sui generis, must then yield to us the provisional conclusion that: while member states’ foreign policies still exist and are important, CFSP meaningfully impacts national foreign policies.
[22] This impact is then the extent to which national autonomy in foreign policy has been required to be given up by member states due to CFSP.
The reason why my paper has tried at length to establish whether the EU can have a foreign policy; to establish its ‘actorness,’ and furthermore, how theoretical approaches perceive the CFSP debate, is that this will lend a degree of exactness to my analysis. To have thought of the EU as an entity at the cusp of becoming a supranational state or as a purely intergovernmental entity would have completely missed all the complexity. But, viewed as a multi-level policy network, the EU allows us to concentrate on the interaction between the different levels so as to see if the policy output is a reflection of this interaction.
The other salient issue for any polity whether we call it sui generis or a village community, is, do their interests converge or are they in conflict? Where interests conflict, are there agreed procedures and rules for their harmonisation? Are the rules respected or is defection the norm? For this paper then, the question is does the same EU – I have attributed actorness to – have common interests to project to the world, and how does it deal with divergence of interests?
Common Interests
It is a truism of international relations that ‘two countries, even allies, seldom have identical national interests.’
[23] This then is seen as one of the obstacles to a CFSP. Indeed, the fact that foreign policy did not become integrated at the same pace as did trade and economic policy does reflect national governments’ sensitivity to national interests conceived as vital interests. This truism however does not take into consideration generational changes specific to the EU, and, the argument presented above of the EU as actor sui generis capable of deploying the cohesion ‘actorness’ attribute, when goals conflict. By generational changes, I mean that the existential threats faced by European leaders between 1945 and 1991 are not exactly the same as those faced by EU leaders today. Therefore, the divisive force the national interest was shortly after the Second World War in Europe, cannot have remained unchanged after so much time has elapsed. As well, changes in the international strategic environment have also foisted challenges on Europe that demand collective action. Thus, the very act of articulating a CFSP is a response to the new environment’s imperatives which demand collective action by the EU if success is to be achieved. I have already mentioned that the failures in the Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia made the EU member states realise that working in concert could produce results that unilateral action could not.
A further point related to commonality of interests we can admit here is the democratic peace thesis, which allows us to argue that the divergences of EU member states’ interests are those of degree rather than kind. The national interests of North Korea can hardly be reconciled with those of Sweden, but Sweden’s differences with France can be bridged. The fourth attribute of ‘actorness’ mentioned above – cohesion – ensures then that the EU under CFSP can mostly iron out their differences and present a united front. One of the latest example of this united front being Baroness Catherine Ashton’s declaration on North Korea on behalf of all 27 member states as well as for the candidate and acceding states.
[24] This can be contrasted with the lack of cohesion in the African Union (AU) which saw 20 countries recognise Libya’s National Transitional Council in 2011 despite the fact that the AU position was that there would be no such recognition while fighting was going on.
[25] What this point illustrates is that the four attributes of ‘actorness’ I discussed above and said were all embodied by the EEAS, make the EU more than the sum of its parts. To an extent, the member states have been institutionalized to negotiate a position to project to the outside world within the EU despite their national interest differences, unlike my AU example above. What then is the logic behind this phenomenon? Why do member states allow themselves to be made to toe the line under CFSP?
Impact of CFSP: Europeanisation
The argument has also been made that there is a paradox to integration. The paradox is that ‘CFSP actually represents a rescue for national foreign policies.’
[26] The argument here is that CFSP has allowed member states who were on the wane to become powers to reckon with again, capable of advancing what has always been their foreign policy preferences. Again, this can be contrasted with the equally valid assertion that ‘participation in the CFSP of the EU and the external relations of the EC alters the foreign policies of member states.’
[27] Europeanisation admits to these two contradictory charges. On the one hand Europeanisation refers to ‘the penetration of the EU into the politics, institutions, and policy making of member states’
[28] This is a situation whereby member states’ policies can be seen to have changed owing to being part of the EU. The evidence of this is easier to discern among acceding members who are required to align their policies with those of the EU. Sweden would be a good example with regards how much of their long-standing neutrality policy they have had to cede to become a member.
The other salient form of Europeanisation refers to the ‘bottom up’ form whereby states upload their preferences to the EU level.
[29] This is a situation whereby some states’ constitutional designs allow them to be pace-setters for the EU agenda.
[30] By so doing these countries can then pursue their foreign policy with the legitimation and capacities of the EU. France which has traditionally preferred a strong Europe to counter-balance the United States is often cited as one country that has benefited from Europeanisation as a ‘bottom up’ activity. Blunden records that the end of the Cold War weakened France’s position, and only the advent of CFSP has been a power multiplier for France.
[31] But even so, it still is ‘a negotiated convergence between the national and supranational’
[32] which is the position I have defended throughout my paper. Even if national capacities favour one nation uploading its preferences, the unanimity rule in reaching decisions on CFSP and the extant contiguity of values in the EU ensures that nothing alien to core values can be introduced to the EU.
CFSP is also an improvement from the previous European Political Cooperation (EPC) and hence has more institutionalized constraints on member states’ autonomy. While foreign policy in the EU has been placed in the intergovernmental second pillar under the Maastricht Treaty, the fact that national governments and elites have been socialised by CFSP’s demand for consistency to consider the EU level when making policy, also bodes well for the impact of CFSP.
Conclusion
My paper has attempted to ascertain the extent to which member states have been required to give up national autonomy under CFSP. I began by trying to avoid the pitfalls of analysis inherent where the EU has been attributed the wrong ‘actorness.’ To this end I argued that the EU should be viewed as actor sui generis, therefore, any analysis should be based on the understanding that CFSP is a multi-level policy network where the national and supranational influence each other.
[33] I have also made the point that the EU is capable of having a foreign policy of its own, owing to its possession of the four attributes of ‘actorness’ I expanded on above; recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion. The most salient point of these attributes is cohesion as it means the EU is capable of making incompatible goals and divergences fit through a negotiated ‘convergence of the national and supranational.’
[34] I then discussed the EU’s common interests so as to ascertain if divergences are potent enough to ensure states will not cede their autonomy in national foreign policy. The observation here was that there is a remarkable contiguity of interests among EU member states and the differences so far can be bridged. This factor, of contiguity of interests, makes it difficult to discern whether CFSP has forced member states to give up their autonomy or they have just continued on the path they would have followed anyway without the EU. We may have to wait until the EU asks Britain and France to cede their Security Council seat to the EU before we are able to discuss an unbridgeable divergence of interests. Europeanisation was also admitted as the paradox that has rescued national autonomy as well as curtailed it. From all the foregoing, the cogent conclusion must be the generally accepted logic that institutions are a middle-level concept; constructed by agents for their benefit but then place constraints on them. EU CFSP is such an institution.
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